Although sending of remittances is a decentralised decision of migrant workers, it has its macroeconomic implication in providing insurance against domestic output shocks in the recipient economies ─ a phenomenon known in literature as risk sharing. Using a large sample of 86 developing countries for the period 1990-2010, we establish that remittance inflows serve as an important channel through which risk sharing takes place in the developing world. Although the extent of risk sharing on average stands at 3.3%, there is substantial cross-country variation found in our sample, ranging from Tajikistan (38%) to Haiti (-13%). Subsequently we explore why the extent of risk sharing through remittances is so diverse across developing countries. The diversification of migrants turns out to be the leading explanation for the extent of risk sharing via remittances: the more diverse the migration destinations of a country, higher will be the amount of risk shared. In addition, size of remittance flows appears to have a strong and statistically significant impact on enhancing risk sharing. We also find suggestive evidence that remittances originating from farther countries facilitate more risk sharing compared to those originating from neighbouring or regional economies. Even after splitting the sample on the basis of country characteristics, our results remain robust. JEL classification: F15; F22; F24; F41; J61
Introduction
Remittance flows represent an important source of external financing for many developing countries. In the past two decades, remittance flows to developing economies exhibit a tenfold increase ̶ from US$ 31 billion in 1990 to US$ 332 billion in 2010 (Ratha et al. 2010 ) ̶ constituting the second largest source of foreign capital after foreign direct investment (FDI). In addition, unlike FDI and private capital flows which decline sharply during the recent global financial crisis, remittances are found to be resilient and relatively less volatile compared to other external flows ( Figure 1 ).
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Unarguably the sheer size and stable pattern of remittance flows make them economically vital for many countries in the developing world.
With the growing importance of remittance flows, synchronously an increasing number of researchers examine their macroeconomic implications on recipient economies.
Towards this end, recent cross-country evidence establishes that remittances impact economic growth (Chami et al. 2003 (Chami et al. , 2008 financial sector development (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2009; Mundaca 2009; Aggarwal et al. 2011 ); institutional quality (Catrinescu et al. 2009; Abdih et al. 2012b) , and other related macroeconomic indicators of recipient economies.
The underlying role of remittances as investigated in the aforementioned research hinges on the cyclical characteristics of these flows over the business cycle ̶ whether remittances move procyclically or countercyclically with respect to output (GDP) of the recipient economy. The conventional wisdom suggests that remittances should move countercyclically with the output, so as to compensate for the lost income of family members owing to economic downturn back home. On the contrary, the procyclical patterns of remittances may further aggravate macroeconomic fluctuations through transmission of shocks from host to recipient country.
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On the specific question of cyclicality of remittances, there is a growing evidence that largely point towards countercyclicality (or low procyclicality) of remittance flows. sharing which in some cases may exceed 100% of permanent consumption (Obstfeld 1994; van Wincoop 1994) . Another motivation for exploring the risk sharing potential of 3 For example, the 1990-91 conflict in the Middle East adversely impacts those economies that are dependent on remittances from the region, such as Pakistan and Bangladesh. In a comprehensive study for Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia economies, Abdih et al. (2012a) conclude that shocks are generally transmitted through remittances to the fiscal balances (i.e. tax receipts) of the recipient economies. 4 While the cross-country studies are few, there is an abundant research from microeconomic perspective (wherein the basic unit of analysis is either the individual or household) that predominantly agree that remittances positively insure individuals against shocks associated with business cycles, natural disasters and civil wars (see for example, Quartey and Blankson 2004; Azam and Gubert 2005; Adams 2006; Gubert 2010) . 5 See, Lewis (1999) for extensive survey of risk sharing literature. Following the literature we use the terms, risk sharing and smoothing, interchangeably throughout this paper.
remittances is that if they are found to be effective in smoothing output shocks, then in view of the optimum currency area (OCA) theory, remittances may be considered as an alternative channel through which prospective member countries of a currency/monetary union can absorb their asymmetric shocks, thereby satisfying the criterion for establishing a union.
It is therefore surprising that empirical studies have often overlooked this crucial aspect of remittance flows, resulting in the scant evidence in research concerning the impact of remittances on risk sharing. [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] , this study does not endeavour to answer why the extent of risk sharing through remittances is so diverse across groups of developing countries.
Given the limited research in the area and exceedingly important role remittances play in overall macroeconomic stabilization of developing economies, it is imperative to explore the risk sharing potential of remittances. This study is a contribution towards this end. In a sample of 86 developing countries over the period 1990-2010, we first measure the extent of risk sharing via remittances for each country in our sample. Our preliminary examination suggests that there is substantial cross-country variation in the estimated degree of risk sharing, ranging from Tajikistan (38%) to Haiti (-13%). As a next logical step, we explore why some developing countries are able to share more risk compared to others. First and foremost, we establish that diversification of emigrants is a leading explanation for the extent of risk sharing via remittances: the more diverse the migration destinations of a country, 6 At the household level, remittances are found to provide ex ante as well as ex post consumption smoothing (Combes and Ebeke 2011) . Remittances may offer ex ante insurance as found in case of some African countries where the remittance-receiving households, instead of auctioning productive assets, utilize their cash holdings during the crisis period. Likewise, an increase in remittances to households when they are unemployed or when the recipient economy is in recession, may serve as an ex post risk sharing arrangement.
higher will be the amount of risk shared. To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of any academic paper that has empirically studied the role of migrant diversification. From risk sharing perspective, more diverse destinations may ensure that remittances are coming from the regions that have less synchronized business cycles, thereby generating aggregate flows that are more countercyclical vis-à-vis domestic economy, than the ones solely originating from a particular region. Our results also support the factual position for some typical remittance-receiving countries such as Philippines and Turkey. Philippines which has a welldiversified migrant population in US, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Europe, absorb around 15% of output shocks according to our estimates; whereas, Turkey with nearly twothirds of migrant workers employed in Germany, exhibits negative smoothing to the magnitude of almost -8%.
Second, we address the issue of whether or not large remittance flows (as ratio to GDP) tend to facilitate more risk sharing. Here we document that size of remittance flows appears to have a strong and statistically significant impact towards enhancing risk sharing.
Third, we obtain intuitive findings that remittances originating from farther countries facilitate more risk sharing compared to those originating from neighbouring countries. This is expected since business cycles are typically more synchronized among regional and neighbouring economies, causing remittances to behave procyclicaly vis-à-vis domestic output thereby resulting in less smoothing or even dis-smoothing of output shocks. Finally, we are not able to observe any prominent role that financial openness, financial sector development and institutional quality, perform to enhance risk sharing capabilities of the recipient economy. In general, even after splitting the samples on the basis of country characteristics our main findings, regarding the measures capturing diversification of migrants and size of remittances, remain unaffected.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the underlying theory of risk sharing that is used to specify the empirical model. Section 3 describes the construction of variable and data sources, while the estimation findings are discussed in detail in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes this paper.
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The empirical model
Theory of risk sharing
In literature, the earliest work in the theoretical model of risk sharing by Diamond (1967) and Wilson (1968) and more recently by Cochrane (1991) , Mace (1991) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) , document that under standard assumptions of iso-elastic preferences and complete markets, individual's consumption should not respond to country-specific output shocks. This is referred in literature as "consumption risk sharing", that is the degree to which consumption growth rate is delinked from growth rate of domestic output. Theoretically, economic agents can completely detach their consumption from domestic output fluctuations, if they purchase claims on foreign countries' output, while in turn foreigners hold claims on domestic output. In this way risk can be fully shared, better known as "perfect consumption risk sharing".
In earlier empirical work on risk sharing, Cochrane (1991) Obstfeld (1994) estimates the relationship between consumption growth rates of each of G7 countries on global consumption growth rate i. e. ∆logc δ α ∆logc ε η and finds only a weak presence of risk sharing in his sample countries.
Although the theoretical notion of perfect risk sharing seems a far-fetched goal;
nevertheless it is of more interest to quantify the extent of risk sharing between countries rather than to test the abstract ideal of perfect risk sharing. It may also be interesting to identify the exact channels through which risk is shared and to quantify the amount of risk sharing obtained via each channel. This has not been possible until the path-breaking study of Asdrubali et al. (1996) and Sørensen and Yosha (1998) that develop a simple accounting methodology to quantify the relative contributions of various channels of risk sharing. Their method decomposes the cross-sectional variance of gross domestic product (GDP) into various components, representing the market (capital and credit markets) and non-market (fiscal system) channels of risk sharing.
Among the various channels derived by Sørensen and Yosha (1998) , income risk sharing occurs primarily through cross-border ownership of assets. An economy would be better placed to sever connections between its income and output fluctuations when it is involved in substantial cross-border financial transactions globally. Since these cross-border financial flows are well recorded in net factor income 7 account, empirical research attempt to quantify income risk sharing by employing the net factor income channel (some notable contributions include, Sørensen and Yosha 1998; Lane 2001; Sørensen et al. 2007; Demyanyk et al. 2008) . Employing net factor income channel to explore the patterns of income risk sharing among OECD and European countries, Sørensen and Yosha (1998) demonstrate that factor income flows fail to make any substantial risk sharing contribution for the period 1966-90, which in essence reflects low level of capital market integration among their sample countries.
Risk sharing via remittances
In order to quantify the risk sharing via remittances, we have used a methodology similar to income risk sharing regressions, to analyse the role of remittances in absorbing output shocks. To measure the income risk sharing, Sørensen et al. (2007) has used the following national accounts identity: Gross National Income (GNI) = Gross Domestic Product (GDP) + Net factor income (NFI). Similarly, we propose a new identity as GDPrem = GDP + remittance inflows. Using this identity to measure the extent of risk sharing via remittances, we run the following regression:
, The coefficient β directly quantifies the fraction of idiosyncratic risk to country i's GDP insured through remittance inflows compared to full (perfect) risk sharing.
Full risk sharing implies that idiosyncratic shocks to GDP and GDPrem are uncorrelated, thereby generating a coefficient of zero in the regression; accordingly approaches to 1.
Similarly, if GDP and GDPrem are perfectly correlated, we expect a coefficient of approaching to 0, thus indicating non-smoothing of output shocks. In case when idiosyncratic
GDPrem reacts more than one-to-one to idiosyncratic GDP, may turn out to be negative, pointing towards dis-smoothing of shocks.
The Equation 1 represents individual country time series regressions. In other words, we run this model for each country observations and derive an estimate ( , which we consider as the extent of risk sharing through remittances. Sørensen and Yosha (1998) employ the risk sharing equations on cross section estimations and obtain the idiosyncratic component (i.e. deviation of a country's growth rate from aggregate growth rate) by removing the time fixed effect. In this paper, we remove the aggregate effect by subtracting the world-wide growth rates of each identity, since we do not run panel regressions and therefore are not able to remove the fixed effect. We deduct the aggregate component from the growth rates as the world fluctuations cannot be eliminated.
After quantifying the amount of risk insured via remittance flows, we further look for the possible determinants of the estimate of risk sharing via remittances. Here we only report our main model and label the explanatory variables, while the underlying reasoning for employing these variables is discussed in subsequent sections. We estimate the following model to explore the leading determinants of risk sharing through remittances:
. 
Data and descriptive statistics
We obtain the data from various sources.
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The remittance inflows data 10 is obtained from World Development Indicators (WDI) database, and is defined as the sum of workers' remittances, compensation of employees, and migrants' transfers.
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WDI offers the remittance data in US$ for a long period of time. Our sample consists of 86 developing countries, nearly all of which have remittances to GDP ratio of 1% or more, on average.
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The period of analysis is from 1990 to 2010, since there is a strong likelihood of negligible risk sharing (via remittances) prior to 1990 as remittance inflows to the developing world remain stagnant al low levels (see Figure 1 ).
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We obtain the GDP, consumer price index (CPI) and population data for each country from IMF's International Financial Statistics 9 For construction of variables and data sources, see Appendix A. 10 For discussion on the definitions and issues related to compilation of data on remittances, see Reinke (2007) . 11 By definition, workers' remittances reflect "current transfers by migrants who are employed in new economies and considered residents there"; compensation of employees cover "wages, salaries, and other benefits earned by individuals-in economies other than those in which they are residents-for work performed for and paid for by residents of those economies"; and, migrants' transfers refer to "contra-entries to the flow of goods and changes in financial items that arise from the migration of individuals from one economy to another" (Reinke 2007, p. 2) . More specifically, transfers by workers that stay less than one year are categorised under compensation of employees, while transfers by those workers that stay for a year or longer are considered residents and categorised as workers' remittances. 12 However there are few exceptions such as China which is included as it is among the top remittance receiving countries in nominal terms: China is the second highest recipient of remittances (in dollar terms) after India in recent years (Ratha and Silwal 2012) . For complete list of sample countries, see Appendix A. 13 In addition, the time period is chosen owing to unavailability of remittances data prior to 1990 for some countries in our sample.
(IFS) database. In order to convert all variables into a uniform currency, we use the annual exchange rates for national currency per US$ from IFS as well. 14 Obtaining the migration data on bilateral basis, we construct a diversification index ( ), similar to the one proposed by , as follows:
where is the ratio of migrants originated from country i, working in country j over the total number of migrants of country i; is the highest ratio among all and N is the total number of countries where the emigrants of country i are distributed over. A higher value of the index implies a higher diversification of migrants across the globe. we construct a distantness variable, which is the weighted average of the distances in thousands of kilometres from the capital city of a particular country to the capital cities of other countries using the total GDP shares of the other countries as weights.
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We obtain the bilateral distance between the capital cities from the French Research Center in International Economics (CEPII). The distantness variable ( ) is expressed as:
where is the distance from the capital city of country i to the capital city of country j;
is the group-wide GDP and T is the total sample length.
Bilateral remittance data is required to compute the shares of remittance inflows originating from OECD countries 16 ( ) and from countries belonging to the same continent ( ). There is scarcity of bilateral data which is only available for few years for our sample countries. We combine various data sources that include Ratha and Shaw (2007) , Jiménez-Martín et al. (2007), Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2008) and Frankel (2011) , to obtain maximum observations. In addition to these sources, we obtain the bilateral remittances data from web pages of some central banks. Because of cross-sectional estimation procedure, we are able to compute approximate values for these variables.
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The descriptive statistics for the variables of main interest are presented in Table 1 .
There is a considerable variation in the estimate of risk sharing ( which has a standard deviation of 8%, with a maximum value of 38% for Tajikistan and a minimum value of -13%
for Haiti. The average score of the migrant diversification index is 2.96 with the range from 7.44 for Syria and 1.09 for Nepal. While the sample countries bear an average remittance to GDP ratio of 5%, for some countries such as Lesotho this ratio is as high as 59%, and for few others such as China it is close to 0%. Based on our distantness measure, countries belonging to East Asia and Pacific region are found to be more distant then the rest of the sample, while countries belonging to Europe and Central Asia are generally least remote: Tonga is the farthest in our sample with a value of 9.45 whereas Poland is least distant with a value of 8.16.
As expected a large share (55%) of remittance inflows to sample countries originate from OECD group (fifth row of Table 1 ). Guinea-Bissau is most heavily dependent with 94% of remittances coming from developed economies. Furthermore on average 58% of remittances are received from those countries that belong to the same continent as the recipient country. Latin American countries typically have a high share of remittances originating from the same continent. Nicaragua is at the top of the list with 98% of remittances originating from same continent, while Philippines and Cambodia witness negligible share of remittances in this regard (sixth row of Table 1 ).
Prior to running regressions, we draw scatter plots (Figures 2-7 ) to examine the possible relationship between the dependent variable (i.e. risk sharing estimate) and other explanatory variables. Figure 2 suggests that there is a positive association between risk sharing estimate and migrant diversification index, indicating that countries with more diverse migrants tend to share more risk via remittances. Similar positive correlation is found in case of risk sharing estimate vis-à-vis remittance to GDP ratio (Figure 3 ), while the other variables also display expected behavior which we discuss in detail in the next section. countries exhibit a positive degree of risk sharing through remittances, while 28 countries report a negative estimate as we do not impose any restriction on the sign of thecoeffecients. As reported earlier, the extent of risk sharing via remittances on average stands at 3.3%, with the range from 38% for Tajikistan and -13% for Haiti.
Empirical results

Individual countries estimates of risk sharing via remittances
A first glance at Table 2 Among Latin America and Caribbean countries, we mostly observe dis-smoothing.
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Since remittance inflows to the region largely originate from North America, the possible explanations for negative risk sharing are the less diversification of migrant destinations and 18 The FGLS is asymptotically more efficient than the OLS when the autoregressive order 1 (AR(1)) exists. The FGLS estimation of the AR(1) model has two different names, originating from different methods estimating the " ". We used the Prais-Winsten estimation, since we have a smaller time series sample and do not afford to lose a single observation. 19 10 out of total of 17 countries belonging to Latin America and Caribbean region show negative risk sharing, resulting in the average smoothing of around -1% for the whole region. This extent of risk sharing is considerably lesser compared to the average smoothing of 3.3% for the whole sample.
highly correlated business cycle with US (as documented by Ratha et al. 2010) ; resulting in procyclical movement of remittances with regards to recipient economies. To fix thoughts, as remittances are known to move in a procyclical fashion with the output of the host country (Sayan 2006; Frankel 2011; Abdih et al. 2012) , at times of economic crisis in US, it may become challenging for a Bolivian worker employed in US to support family members facing the same economic conditions back home. This is also apparent in Figure 8 , which shows that those countries which receive relatively lesser share of remittances from North America witness higher risk sharing (e.g., Ecuador and Colombia), compared to others (e.g., El
Salvador Apart from other factors, we conjecture that this is possibly an outcome of large size of remittance inflows to Tajikistan, which has the highest remittance to GDP ratio (around 50%)
in the world during the recent years (Slay and Bravi 2011) . Balli et al. (2012) estimate that about 6% of the output shocks are buffered through remittances for a sample of non-oil MENA countries that include Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. 21 Tajikistan maintains a considerably high average remittance to GDP ratio of 25% in the last two decades (based on our own calculations).
(GCC) countries: 65% of all remittances come from GCC in 2009. This heavy dependence to a particular region may have resulted in dis-smoothing of output shocks via remittances.
Pakistan also has a higher share of remittance inflows (56%) from GCC economies;
consequently the extent of positive smoothing is nominal.
Determinants of risk sharing via remittances
The aforementioned discussion is primarily based on the findings of other studies that at best, may partly explain the cross-country patterns of smoothing. There is a need, therefore, to systematically investigate the underlying factors that explain the large crosscountry differences in the estimated degree of smoothing via remittances. Hence in this section, we endeavour to examine the likely determinants of risk sharing through remittance flows.
As this study is at the crossroads of remittance and risk sharing literatures, we survey both these strands of research and shortlisted some important indicators that may possibly determine the magnitude of smoothing via remittances. We examine these indicators under two specific categories: first, we think about whether the diversification of migrants, size of remittances and the locational characteristics of remittance-originating countries matter for risk sharing, and; second, we look for other potential determinants, such as the degree of financial openness, financial development and institutional quality of the recipient economy, that may affect risk sharing to varying degrees. In Table 3 , we hold the diversification measure fixed, and introduce all the other explanatory variables including the control variables one by one, in order to check the stability of the coefficient of the diversification measure. The migrant diversification measure comes out to be positively significant in all models (Columns 1-8), implying that the more diverse the migration destinations, higher will be the amount of risk shared in the recipient economy. A factual case in point here is Philippines whose emigrants are well-diversified globally with presence in US, GCC and Europe and consequently has a substantially high risk sharing estimate (15%). On the contrary, Turkish and Haitian emigrants are concentrated in few destinations (mostly Germany and US, respectively)
Diversification, size and sources of remittances
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, and may therefore generate remittances that are unable to smooth output fluctuations (-8% and -13%, respectively).
Second, we address an important issue of whether or not relatively large remittancerecipient countries tend to share more risk than others. The size of remittance flows as measured by remittances to GDP ratio is statistically significant at 1% level (Columns 2 and 8), suggesting that higher remittance flows lead to higher risk sharing. As another countercheck, all top five recipient economies in terms of size of remittances (in recent years)
are found to share a substantial amount of risk through remittances. For instance, 38% of output shocks are being absorbed in Tajikistan, having a remittance to GDP ratio of 50%;
26% of risk shared in Tonga with 38% remittance to GDP ratio; 3% of risk shared in Moldova with 31% remittance to GDP ratio; 15% of risk shared in Kyrgyzstan with 28% remittance to GDP ratio, and; 26% of risk shared in Lesotho with 27% remittance to GDP ratio.
Both our proxies for migrant diversification and size of remittances appear to be the leading determinants of risk sharing via remittances, as together they capture almost 28% of the variation in the risk sharing estimate, as indicated by a reasonably high R-squared (Column 2) given the cross-section nature of our estimations. 22 To prove their point, Ratha et al. (2010) documents that remittance inflows to India witness a modest decline during the recent global financial crisis mainly because of well-diversified Indian immigrants to GCC (40%), North America (20%) and other regions (40%). 23 It has been documented that almost two-thirds of Turkish migrant workers are employed in Germany (Sayan 2006 ) and half of Haitian migrant workers are employed in US (Ratha et al. 2010 ).
In Columns 3-5, we use the proxies representing the locational characteristics of the remittance-sending countries that are similar to the variables commonly used in gravity models from trade literature. In the risk sharing context, remittances that come from distant countries may have opposite implications then the ones that come from less remote or regional countries, owing to the degree of business cycle correlations. The estimated coefficients, for the Distantness, the proxy capturing "remoteness" and information frictions;
OECD share, indicating the proportion of remittance inflows from OECD group; and Continent share, indicating the share of remittances coming from countries belonging to the same continent, point towards similar outcomes. For either of these measures, we obtain intuitive findings suggesting that remittances originating from farther countries facilitate more risk sharing compared to those originating from neighbouring countries.
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This is expected since business cycles are typically more synchronized among regional and neighbouring economies, causing remittances to behave procyclicaly vis-à-vis domestic output thereby resulting in less smoothing or even dis-smoothing of output shocks. 
Financial openness, financial development and institutional quality indicators
Apart from the aforementioned indicators, we search for other potential determinants of smoothing based on the survey of remittance and risk sharing literatures. In this regard, we are further interested to explore whether the degree of financial openness, financial development and institutional quality, influence a recipient country's capacity to absorb output shocks through remittances. In Table 4 , we present the estimations by adding the relevant measures one by one, along with controls relating to the size of the economy and the stock of emigrants.
Our first indicator is the measure for financial openness that appears to have an expected positive (albeit insignificant) impact on smoothing via remittances. We then examine whether financial sector development play any role in absorbing output shocks 24 The interpretation for the negative coefficient for OECD share is not straightforward. There are some strong channels through which shocks are known to be transmitted from OECD to developing economies depending on the varying degrees of their financial exposure. This has possibly resulted in producing business cycles that move in tandem in both developed and developing world, thus generating remittances from the OECD region that are procyclical to the recipient economy. 25 As mentioned earlier, in a situation where host and recipient economies are going through recession phase at the same time, smoothing would not occur since it would be hard for migrant workers to support family members facing similar financial conditions back home (Sayan 2006; Frankel 2011 (2011)).
Here we use three different measures to proxy for financial sector development, that
include (1) As in the previous case, we introduce three measures that reflect different dimensions of the institutional quality of the recipient economies, namely regulatory quality, government effectiveness and Corruption Perception index. We find that all the measures for institutional quality exert a positive but statistically insignificant impact on risk sharing via remittances (Columns 5-7). Overall we are not able to observe any prominent role that financial openness, financial sector development and institutional quality, perform to enhance risk sharing capabilities of the recipient economy.
Robustness checks (Sub-sample analysis)
To investigate whether our earlier results are sample-specific, we group our sample countries on the basis of relevant country characteristics namely, high/low remittance to GDP countries, high/low emigrant to population countries, high/low financially open countries, high/low financially developed countries, and non-African/African countries. Although the distinction between high and low categories is subjective and is essentially driven by the aggregate sample size 27 ; nevertheless, these groupings are fairly representative of the underlying characteristics on which they are based on. For instance, high remittance to GDP countries, bear on average remittances exceeding 9% of GDP, while low remittance to GDP countries maintain only 1% remittance to GDP ratio (on average).
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As can be seen from Table 5 , the estimate for migrant diversification is strongly significant in all sub-samples, implying that higher diversification of emigrants facilitate higher smoothing through remittances. Similarly, Table 6 Among all subsamples, we are particularly interested to see whether our main variables behave differently with the inclusion of other explanatory variables in case of 27 Considering the aggregate sample of 86 countries and in order to retain sufficient number of observations (in each group) for estimation purposes, the groupings turn out to be of approximately equal size. 28 Similar is the case with all other groups. For high/low remittance (to GDP) countries: all countries with remittances more than 3% of GDP are included in high remittance to GDP group (group mean: 10%), while those with less than 3% of GDP are included in low remittance to GDP group (group mean: 1%). For high/low emigrant (to population) countries: all countries with immigrants above 5% of population are included in high category (group mean: 18%), while countries with below 5% value are included in low category (group mean: 2%). For high/low financially open countries: all countries that have Chin Ito index values between -0.3 to 2.5 are considered high financially open countries (group mean: 0.8), while countries with index values between -0.3 and -2.5 are included in low category (group mean: -1.1). For high/low financially developed countries: all countries that have M2 to GDP ratio above 30% belong to high financially developed countries (group mean: 53%), while those with below 30% value are categorized under low financially developed countries (group mean: 22%). For non-African and African countries: countries belonging to Sub-Saharan Africa are indicated as African countries, while all other countries mentioned in Table 2 are categorized as non-African countries.
high/low categories of financially open countries and financially developed countries. This is primarily for the reason that these country characteristics appear to be vital for an effective role of remittances in providing insurance against output shocks. Also our previous results indicate that the level of significance of both migrant diversification and size of remittance measures differ among these subsamples. Table 7 reports the results in the presence of other explanatory variables. As established earlier, size of remittance flows does not affect the extent of smoothing in more open economies (Column 1). However surprisingly, the role of diversification of migrants appears to be ineffective in less open economies (Column 2). By contrast, in high/low financially developed countries, both our proxies for migrant diversification and size of remittances are significant. Our findings here do not conform to Combes and Ebeke (2011) which suggest that remittances work better towards stabilizing consumption in less financially developed economies. The coefficients of the other explanatory variables related to the locational characteristics of the remittance-originating countries (i.e. Distantness, OECD share, and Continent share) have the expected signs but are mostly insignificant. To conclude, even after splitting the samples our main findings, by and large, remain unaffected.
Concluding remarks
Remittances are considered as a valuable source of foreign exchange in many developing countries particularly in times of economic downturns. Unlike FDI and private capital flows which often rise during booms and depress during economic downturns, remittances are found to be countercyclical and relatively less volatile compared to other external flows. With the growing importance of remittance flows, synchronously an increasing number of researchers examine their macroeconomic implications on recipient economies. Contributing to this strand of literature, our paper examines a potentially important role of migrants' remittances in providing insurance against domestic output shocks. Using a large sample of 86 developing countries over the period 1990-2010, our results suggest that remittance inflows provide an important channel through which risk sharing might take place in the developing world. Although the extent of risk sharing via remittances on average stands at 3.3%, there is substantial cross-country variation found in our sample, ranging from Tajikistan (38%) to Haiti (-13%). We therefore thought it necessary to explore why the impact of remittances is so heterogeneous across developing countries.
Against this background, our study documents some leading determinants of risk sharing via remittances. Most importantly, we estimate that those countries whose migrants are well-diversified globally, share more risk than others. The factual position for some typical remittance-receiving countries such as Philippines and Turkey, offers a case in point.
Philippines which has a well-diversified migrant population in US, GCC and Europe, absorb around 15% of output shocks according to our estimates; whereas, Turkey with nearly twothirds of migrant workers employed in Germany, exhibits negative smoothing by almost -8%.
In addition, size of remittance flows appears to have a strong and statistically significant impact on enhancing risk sharing. We also find suggestive evidence that remittances originating from farther countries facilitate more risk sharing compared to those originating from neighbouring countries. Even after splitting the samples, our results stay almost the same, meaning that the main conclusions with respect to the positive impact of migrant diversification and size of remittance flows on risk sharing are robust.
From the currency/monetary union perspective, our results point out that for several developing economies that aim to be part of a prospective union, remittances can provide an effective channel to absorb asymmetric output shocks and should therefore be considered in the discussion on optimum currency area (OCA). In this regard, our results further support Frankel (2011, p.14) which concludes that "remittances should join trade, labor mobility, and transfers, on the list of optimum currency area criteria". Needless to mention here that the insurance role of remittances may actually turn out to be more pronounced, as a large chunk of remittance flows that are transmitted through informal channels, remain unrecorded in official estimates. 
Explanatory variables Migrant diversification index
It measures the extent of diversification of migrant workers of a country across the world. The index is constructed as: 1 ∑ ⁄ , where θ is the ratio of migrants originated from country i, working in country j over the total number of migrants of country i;
is the highest ratio among all and N is the total number of countries where the emigrants of country i are distributed over. The data on bilateral migrant stocks is extracted from Global Bilateral Migration Database (GBMD) of World Bank.
Distantness
It is the weighted average of the distances in thousands of kilometres from the capital city of a particular country to the capital cities of other countries using the total GDP shares of the other countries as weights. It is calculated as:
where is the distance from the capital city of country i to the capital city of country j; is the group-wide GDP and T is the total sample length. The bilateral distance between the capital cities is obtained from the French Research Center in International Economics (CEPII).
OECD share
It measures the share of total remittance inflows originating from OECD countries. The bilateral remittance data is obtained from Ratha and Shaw (2007) , Jiménez-Martin et al. (2007) , Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2008), Frankel (2011) and from web pages of several central banks.
Continent share
It measures the share of total remittance inflows coming from countries belonging to the same continent as the recipient country.
Financial openness (index)
It is based on Chin-Ito index which measures a country's degree of capital account openness. The index is based on the binary dummy variables that codify the tabulation of restrictions on cross-border financial transactions reported in the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) (Source: Ito 2008, 2012 Notes: The dependent variable quantifies the extent of risk sharing through remittance inflows by country in year , and is obtained from the regression Equation 1( ) as explained in Section 2.2. This table reports cross-section estimations including a constant term and employing OLS technique. All variables are averaged across time for each country. White heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are given in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. For detailed description of explanatory variables, see Appendix A. Table 3 . White heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are given in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. For detailed description of the explanatory variables, see Appendix A. Notes: The estimation procedure is the same as mentioned in notes of Table 3 . White heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are given in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Notes: The estimation procedure is the same as mentioned in notes of Table 3 . White heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are given in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
